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This articles studies the optimal tax mix (taxes on income and commodities) under
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tion comparisons. The model includes both positional and nonpositional goods, taking
into account the fact that relative concerns matter for some but not for all commodities.
We ￿nd that in general the whole tax system is a￿ected by the externalities caused by
the consumption of positional goods, notably also the taxes on income and on a non-
positional good. The tax rates on positional goods are higher than in the absence of
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income tax schedule is ambiguous and depends crucially on whether status goods are
complements or substitutes to leisure.
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This paper studies the optimal mix of a nonlinear income tax and proportional commodity taxes
in the presence of relative consumption concerns. Most part of the optimal taxation literature
assumes that the utility of individuals depends only on their own consumption of goods and leisure.
However, there is increasing empirical evidence suggesting that individuals value not only their own
absolute consumption but also their relative consumption with respect to others. 1 Moreover, there
is evidence indicating that some goods are more positional than others (e.g. Alpizar et al., 2005
and Solnick and Hemenway, 2005). Typically, visible forms of consumption such as clothing or
housing tend to be more positional than less visible forms such as food or insurance consumption.
In accordance with this empirical evidence we construct a model that allows us to analyze the
optimal tax structure assuming that some but not all commodities are positional.
The idea that individuals care about their relative position in society was ￿rst pronounced by
Veblen (1899), but his view was soon displaced by the simpler neoclassical theory of consumer
behavior. In an important work Dusenberry (1949) reintroduced relative preferences to consumer
theory and established the relative income hypothesis, which states that the utility an individual
derives from a given consumption level depends strongly on its relative magnitude in the society.
Since the late 70’s a literature on optimal policy issues when relative consumption matters, has
gradually developed (e.g. Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 1980; Oswald, 1983; Ireland, 2001;
Wendner and Goulder, 2008; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenmann, 2008, 2010; Micheletto, 2010). 2
It has become evident from these studies that several standard results concerning optimal tax policy
and public good provision do not hold or at least have to be adapted if one takes status e￿ects into
account. For example, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenmann (2008) show that the optimal income
tax schedule di￿ers signi￿cantly from the one in the conventional case, implying substantially
higher marginal income tax rates. However, this literature typically assumes that there is only one
consumption good and thus, does not di￿erentiate between positional and nonpositional forms of
consumption, as we do.
Our paper is also related to a di￿erent strand of the literature that studies optimal mixed
taxation (income and commodities) in an asymmetric information setting a la Mirrlees (1971)
in the presence of consumption externalities (Pirttil￿ and Tuomala, 1997; Cremer et al., 1998;
Kopczuk, 2003; Micheletto, 2008). When consuming status goods individuals impose a utility loss
1See e.g. Easterlin (2001), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005), Carlsson
et al. (2007) and Card et al. (2010). A survey of the literature is provided by Clark et al. (2008).
2Relative consumption concerns were also introduced in models analyzing growth (e.g. Corneo and Jeane, 1997,
2001; Wendner, 2010) or asset pricing (Abel, 1999; Dupor and Liu, 2003).
2on others by increasing the reference level to which individuals compare their own consumption
to, which can be viewed as a consumption externality. One important result from these previous
studies is that the so called ’additivity property’ ￿rst discovered by Sandmo (1975) also carries over
to the more general optimal mixed tax case with heterogeneous agents, at least if the externality
is of the ’atmospheric’ type.3 The ’additivity property’ states that an externality is best addressed
by imposing a tax directly on the externality-generating good while the rest of the tax system
should be una￿ected by the externality. However, in a recent paper Micheletto (2008) has shown
that for the ’additivity property’ to be valid it is essential that di￿erent types are equally e￿ective
as externality-generating units, i.e. it should not matter which individual increases the level of the
externality with his/her consumption (as it is the case if the externality is of the ’atmospheric’
type). This is typically ful￿lled for environmental externalities but needs not necessarily be the
case for positional externalities, where it is plausible that di￿erent agents have varying reference
groups and where the identity of the consumer whose consumption increases the reference level
might in fact be relevant.4 We con￿rm this result and show that in general the whole tax system
is a￿ected by the positional externalities.
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the ￿rst one that studies jointly optimal
income and commodity taxation in the presence of both positional and nonpositional goods, paying
attention to the fact that some but not all commodities are positional. This is of relevance because
the mixed tax case, in which income is taxed on a nonlinear scale, while commodity taxes are
restricted to be linear, corresponds closely to most actual tax systems in developed countries.
Thus, it seems to be the appropriate framework for a complete analysis of the in￿uence of relative
consumption concerns on the optimal tax structure. Further, we extend previous work on optimal
mixed taxation and consumption externalities to a multi-externality setting. So far the literature
has con￿ned the analysis to cases with only one externality-generating good. An exception is
Eckerstorfer (2011) who studies the optimal income and commodity tax structure in a multi-
externality model, where however, in contrast to the present study, the externalities are restricted
to be of the ’atmospheric’ type.
From a policy perspective a main result of our model is that di￿erential taxation of commodities
is welfare improving and that status goods should be taxed at a higher rate. This is not surprising
since in our framework the consumption of status goods generates a negative externality, and hence
3The term ’atmospheric’ externality was introduced by Meade (1952). It is used when the externality depends on
the total consumption of a particular good.
4For example, if one thinks of upward-comparison, meaning that individuals have a tendency to refer upwards in
the income distribution, then the consumption of the rich gets a larger weight in the formation of the reference
level.
3taxing these goods internalizes the externalities. This point has already been raised amongst others
by Frank (1999, 2008) who has, however, concerns about the political feasibility of a tax system
that taxes status goods at a di￿erent rate. We share this point only to some extent, as various
tax systems include certain forms of luxury taxation. 5 For example, Australia levies a luxury car
tax which has to be paid at the time of the purchase if the price of a new car exceeds a certain
threshold. Another example is the mansion tax in the State of New York that is levied on Real
Estate property at the time of a transfer when the consideration for the entire conveyance exceeds
$ 1 million.6 A popular argument in the political debate in favor of taxes on luxury goods is
that they hurt the rich and are hence a redistributive instrument. However, Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) have taught us that under a mild separability assumption between goods and leisure all
redistribution should be carried out through the labor income tax. Hence, according to this result
di￿erential taxation of luxuries is not e￿cient for redistributive reasons. But in this paper we
provide a di￿erent argument in favor of taxing status goods, one that has rarely found recognition
in the political debate.
We proceed in the following way. First, we set up a generalized version of the two-group optimal
tax model (Stiglitz, 1982) where individuals di￿er in earning abilities and tastes. Taste di￿erences
are re￿ected by di￿erent reference levels for the two types. As is common in the optimal taxation
literature, earning abilities are private information to the individual. Hence, ￿rst-best taxation
of abilities is not feasible which is why the government has to use a general income tax as a
second-best instrument. There are three consumption goods in the economy. Two of them are
positional goods and one good is a nonpositional good, where as usual only absolute consumption
matters.7 Reference levels to which individuals compare their own consumption are formed by
a weighted average of total consumption of a positional good. Our formulation of the reference
levels is ￿exible enough to include several variants discussed in the literature such as upward or
within-group comparison. Each commodity is subject to a proportional tax rate, i.e. the tax
system consists of a nonlinear income tax and proportional commodity tax rates.
In a next step we present our results on the optimal commodity tax structure. We derive
an implicit solution for the optimal tax rates on both positional and nonpositional goods. An
5In most cases luxury goods and status goods coincide. Therefore, we consider taxation of status goods as a form
of luxury taxation.
6Other OECD countries that have certain forms of luxury taxation include Denmark, Hungary and Turkey. A
famous example for a luxury tax in the USA mentioned in Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) was created by the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. A 10% excise tax was imposed on the portion of the retail price of
certain items that exceeded a product speci￿c threshold, which was $30000 for cars, $100000 for boats and yachts,
$250000 for aircraft, and $10000 for jewelry. The luxury taxes on boats, aircraft and jewelry were repealed in
1993, the one on cars in 2002.
7In principle the model could be extended to include n+m commodities. But in order to keep the model as simple
as possible we decided to work with only three commodities, which already makes the analysis quite complex.
4interesting implication of our multi-externality assumption is the result that the Pigouvian elements
in the tax formulas depend on both externalities, implying that the interdependence between the
positional commodities is of importance. Further, we show that in general both the tax rates on
the positional as well as on the nonpositional goods depend in a complex way on the Pigouvian
elements. Thus, it is optimal to use the whole set of commodity taxes to internalize the externalities,
which violates the ’additivity property’. If, however, the consumption of the high- and the low-
able individuals is weighted in the same way in the formation of the reference levels, then the tax
rate on the nonpositional good is not a￿ected by the externalities and the tax formulas on the
positional goods simplify substantially. The same is true if there are no compensated cross price
e￿ects and/or individuals react in the same way to relative price changes.
Finally, we also discuss the optimal income tax schedule. We ￿nd that in general also the income
tax is a￿ected by the externalities, which also is in contradiction to the ’additivity property’. But
again, if the consumption of the two income groups is weighted in the same way in the formation of
the reference levels then the optimal marginal income tax rates contain no Pigouvian elements. We
also discuss the optimal income tax schedule if commodity taxes are restricted to be uniform for
example due to political economy reasons. In that case only the income tax can be used to correct
for the externalities. In contrast to the previous literature that studies the optimal income tax in
the presence of relative consumption concerns (e.g. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008) we
di￿erentiate between positional and nonpositional forms of consumption. This implies that the
sign of the Pigouvian part in the income tax schedule depends crucially on whether the positional
goods are complements or substitutes to leisure. Moreover, we show that if the consumption of
the rich is weighted higher in the formation of the reference levels (upward comparison) then with
a mild additional assumption the Pigouvian part in the income tax schedule is progressive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and the max-
imization problem of the households and the government. In section 3 we discuss the optimal
commodity tax structure and in section 4 the results on the optimal income tax schedule. Section
4 provides some discussion of the results.
2 The model
We consider an economy consisting of two types of individuals i = L;H, who di￿er in earning abil-
ities !L < !H. The size of the population is normalized to one and i represents the proportion of
individuals of type i in the population. By providing labor supply li individuals earn gross income
5zi = !ili. Gross income zi is subject to a nonlinear income tax and the resulting net income is
denoted by xi. Individuals spend their net income on the consumption of three commodities cj,
j = 1;2;3, which are produced with a linear technology with labor as the only input to production.
Quantities are chosen in such a way that the (constant) marginal costs of production are equal to
one, i.e. the producer prices of all commodities are equal to one.
The consumers’ problem and relative concerns
In our model commodities k = 1;2 are assumed to be positional goods, i.e. for these goods
individuals care not only about their absolute value of consumption but also about their relative
consumption with respect to others. 8 Commodity 3 on the other hand is a nonpositional good
where only absolute consumption matters. As is common in the literature we assume that for
the positional commodities each individual compares his/her own consumption to some reference
consumption level which is determined by
ckL = kL(L)LckL + kH(L)HckH (1)
for the L type and by
ckH = kL(H)LckL + kH(H)HckH (2)
for the H type, with k = 1;2. As in previous work we assume that the reference consumption levels
are treated as exogenous to the individual. The intuition for this assumption is that individuals
consider their own contribution to the reference levels as extremely small.
Highly relevant for our analysis later on will be the nonnegative weights kL(i) and kH(i),
k = 1;2 and i = L;H. Observe that the reference levels of the two types di￿er in general, i.e.
an L type compares his/her own consumption to a di￿erent reference level than an H type. Only
if ki(L) = ki(H) the reference levels of the two types are identical. Further note that the
consumption of the two types is allowed to be weighted di￿erently in the formation of the reference
level as in general kL(i) 6= kH(i). This means that the consumption of the H types might be
weighted higher (lower) in the formation of the reference levels than the consumption of the L
types.
In its simplest form where all weights are equal to one, reference consumption levels are equal
8We use the index j = 1;2;3 when we talk about all commodities and the index k = 1;2 when we talk about the
positional commodities.
6to the average consumption of the speci￿c commodity in the economy. In that case both types
face the same reference levels and their consumption is weighted equally in the formation of cki,
k = 1;2 and i = L;H. However, our formulation of the reference levels is also ￿exible enough to
implement other variants discussed in the literature, such as upward comparison or within-group
comparison, just by adapting weights properly. 9
Following earlier contributions to the literature (e.g., Akerlof, (1997); Corneo and Jeanne, (1997);
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, (2008, 2010)) relative concerns are modeled as the di￿erence
between own consumption and the reference consumption levels c1i and c2i, i.e. by 1i = c1i  c1i
and 2i = c2i   c2i, i = L;H. Thus, in addition to own consumption and labor supply, 1i
and 2i become part of the utility function. Both types have the same strictly concave utility
function, u(c1i;c2i;c3i;li;1i;2i), with ￿rst partial derivatives being positive with respect to
c1i;c2i;c3i;1i;2i and negative with respect to li.10 This implies that the utility of an individual
i decreases with c1i and c2i. Thus, the consumption of good 1 and 2 generates what we call a
positional externality, since individuals do not take into account the e￿ect their own consump-
tion of commodities 1 and 2 has on others via the reference levels. That is, when consuming
positional commodities individuals increase the reference consumption levels, which worsens the
relative position of other individuals.
The individuals’ maximization problem is broken into two steps. In a ￿rst step, an individual
i allocates a ￿xed amount of net income xi over the consumption goods. Consumer prices are
denoted by pj = 1 + j, j = 1;2;3, i.e. the government imposes a proportional commodity tax
j on each of the three commodities. Maximizing utility subject to the private budget constraint
yields conditional indirect utility for given gross and net income:
vi(xi;zi;p1;p2;p3;c1i;c2i)  max
c1i;c2i;c3i
fu(c1i;c2i;c3i;zi=!i;1i;2i)jp1c1i + p2c2i + p3c3i  xig:
(3)
Solving the private maximization problem described by (3) yields conditional demand functions
cji = cji(xi;zi;p1;p2;p3;c1i;c2i); (4)
9Upward comparison means that individuals compare themselves to other individuals above them in the income
distribution whereas within-group comparison means that individuals compare themselves to individuals in the
same income group.
10As in most other studies leisure is assumed to be nonpositional, which is justi￿ed by a number of empirical
results (e.g. Carlsson et al. (2007)). An exception is Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2009), who assume that
individuals care about both relative consumption and relative leisure.
7j = 1;2;3 and i = L;H. Observe that in general the demand for all commodities depends on the
reference levels c1i and c2i.
In a second step, individuals determine their optimal labor supply by maximizing conditional
indirect utility vi(xi;zi;p1;p2;p3;c1i;c2i) subject to the budget equation xi = zi   T(zi), where
T(zi) denotes the nonlinear income tax function. Assuming that the income tax function is di￿er-
entiable and letting the marginal income tax rate be denoted by T0(zi), individuals choose their
labor supply such that





The government’s objective is to design a tax system, consisting of a general income tax and
proportional commodity taxes 1;2;3, that maximizes a weighted sum of the individuals’ utility
subject to a resource constraint and a self-selection constraint, and that takes into account the
positional externalities induced by the consumption of goods 1 and 2. The problem of ￿nding the
optimal income tax schedule can equivalently be stated by determining the optimal gross and net
income bundles xi;zi for each type. Thus, the optimal income tax for the two types of individuals
is determined implicitly as the di￿erence zi xi, i = L;H. Note that the available tax instruments
are completely determined by the information structure of the model. Type speci￿c ￿rst-best
lump-sum taxes are not feasible because earning abilities !i and labor supply li are not observable
to the government. Only gross income zi and the distribution of types are observable, which is
why the government has to use a nonlinear income tax as a second-best instrument. Further,
consumption is assumed to be observable only in the aggregate, while individual consumption
levels are private information. In other words the government does not know who buys how much
of what good. As a consequence nonlinear commodity taxes are not feasible, and the government
can tax consumption only at a proportional rate.
The utilitarian social welfare function, which is the objective function of the maximization




where fL and fH, with fL  fH  0, represent the weights of the two types of individuals
8including the fractions L and H. We assume that the agent monotonicity condition is ful￿lled,
meaning that MRSL
zx > MRSH
zx holds at any vector (z;x), where MRSi
zx is de￿ned as MRSi
zx 
 (@vi=@zi)=(@vi=@xi). This implies that for any income tax function the high-able individual does
not choose to earn less income than the low-able.
The resource constraint reads
L(zL   xL) + H(zH   xH) +
X
j=1;2;3
j(LcjL + HcjH)  g; (7)
i.e. tax revenues have to be raised to ￿nance exogenous public spending g. In addition the
government is constrained by a self-selection constraint, which is given by
vH(xH;zH;p1;p2;p3;c1H;c2H)  vH(xL;zL;p1;p2;p3;c1L;c2L): (8)
It guarantees that the high-able individual does not prefer the bundle which is designed for the
low-able individual. The constraint that the L type does not mimic the H type is not binding
in the optimum and therefore neglected, given that we restrict the analysis to cases, where the
government wants to redistribute from high- to low-ability persons. Observe that we assume that
the reference levels for the mimicker and the L types are identical, i.e. type H when mimicking
compares his/her consumption to ckL, k = 1;2. Hence, we assume that income (and not ability)
is decisive for the chosen reference level. 11 To abbreviate notation indirect utility of the mimicker
is denoted by vH[L] and consumption of the mimicker by cjH[L].
In addition the de￿nitions of the reference levels given by (1) and (2) are taken into account as
separate (equality) constraints. The Lagrange multipliers for the resource and the self-selection
constraint are denoted by  and , respectively, and the multipliers for the reference levels are
given by 1L;1H;2L;2H. The Lagrangean function of the government’s maximization problem
can thus be written as
L = fLvL + fHvH + [L(zL   xL) + H(zH   xH) +
X
j=1;2;3
j(LcjL + HcjH)   g]
+(vH   vH[L]) + 1L(c1L   1L(L)Lc1L   1H(L)Hc1H) + 1H(c1H
 1L(H)Lc1L   1H(H)Hc1H) + 2L(c2L   2L(L)Lc2L   2H(L)Hc2H)
+2H(c2H   2L(H)Lc2L   2H(H)Hc2H): (9)
11A similar assumption is made by Micheletto (2010). However, one could also think of a situation where the
mimicker continues to compare his/her consumption to the reference levels of the H type. As our main results
remain valid under both variants, we chose the one that seems more plausible to us.
9The government maximizes the Lagrangean with respect to xi;zi;j and also with respect to
cki. The ￿rst-order conditions for this maximization problem are provided in the Appendix. To
summarize, the goal of the government is to design a tax system that redistributes income in an
e￿cient way and that internalizes the externalities induced by the consumption of commodities 1
and 2.
3 Optimal taxation of commodities
As is well known from the literature (e.g. Pirttil￿ and Tuomala, 1997; Cremer et al., 1998), the
result by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), which states that commodity taxes are redundant in the
presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax if preferences are weakly separable in labor supply
and consumption, does not hold if there are consumption externalities. Taxing the externality-
generating good increases welfare as this allows to internalize the externality. Further, it has been
shown that the additivity property discovered by Sandmo (1975) continues to hold in this more
general model of the Mirrleesian type. The additivity property consists of two characteristics.
First, the presence of an externality-generating good only alters the tax formula for that particular
good and leaves other tax instruments una￿ected by the externality. Second, the Pigouvian part of
taxation appears additively in the tax formula. However, in a recent paper Micheletto (2008) has
shown that for the ’additivity property’ to hold in this context it is essential that the externality is
of the ’atmospheric’ type. If individuals of di￿erent ability are not equally e￿ective as externality-
generating units, then the ’additivity property’ is in general violated and a role for other tax
instruments arises to internalize the externality.
We generalize this discussion to a setting where there are two externality-generating goods,
while the previous literature considered only one externality-generating good. This allows us to
analyze the interdependence of the two externality-generating commodities and its consequences
for the optimal tax structure. Further, we focus on positional externalities, where in contrast to
the ’atmospheric’ type it in fact matters which individual increases with his/her consumption the
level of the externality (see equations 1 and 2).
3.1 Shadow prices
We start this section with a discussion of the shadow prices of the externalities, as they will be
important for our discussion of optimal income and commodity taxes later on. In the derivation
of the expressions for the shadow prices we extend the approach by Pirttil￿ and Tuomala (1997),
10which we generalize for our purposes. Let the shadow prices (measured in terms of the government’s
tax revenues) be denoted by ki=, k = 1;2 and i = L;H, and let the marginal rate of substitution





It can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay of an individual i to reduce the reference
consumption level cki by one unit. Lemma 1 describes the system of equations that determines
the shadow prices of the externalities.
Lemma 1: In our model the shadow prices of the externalities measured in terms of tax rev-




































































where compensated demand for commodity j of an individual i is denoted by ccom
ji . We call A a



















































































Proof: A derivation of Lemma 1 is provided in the Appendix.
As is shown in the Appendix, Lemma 1 follows from the ￿rst-order conditions of the govern-
ment’s maximization problem. Altogether there are four shadow prices, two for each type. They
can be interpreted as the social harm or gain of a speci￿c externality measured in terms of tax
revenues.
Lemma 1 reveals some interesting implications of our multi-externality setting. The feedback
matrix A is a generalization of the feedback parameter discussed by Pirttil￿ and Tuomala (1997) for
11the case where only the consumption of one good causes an externality and where both types face
the same externality. It captures the weighted reaction of compensated demand for the externality-
generating commodities 1 and 2 in case of a marginal increase of the level of a speci￿c externality.
If those e￿ects are nonzero, i.e. if @ccom
1i =@c2i 6= 0 and @ccom
2i =@c1i 6= 0, then the shadow prices
depend on each other. That is, the social harm or gain of a speci￿c externality also depends on
the social harm or gain of the other externalities.
On the right-hand side of (11) one can see that kL= and kH=, k = 1;2, di￿er in one
important aspect. The shadow prices of the H types contain no impact on the self-selection
constraint. This is because of our assumption that a high-able individual when mimicking compares





@xL (MWPkH[L]   MWPkL) is ambiguous. It depends on whether the mimicker or the
L-type has a higher marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality. Note that the only
di￿erence between them is labor supply provided as the mimicker is more productive but their
income is the same, i.e. the sign depends on @MWPki=@li R 0. If the mimicker has a higher
marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality than the L type the value of the shadow price
is reduced, because then the mimicker is hurt more by the externality and thus an increase of the
reference consumption level gives slack to the self-selection constraint. Obviously the term is zero
if the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality is independent of leisure. However, to
our knowledge no empirical evidence on this issue exists, which is why the sign of the e￿ect on the
self-selection constraint is left open.
All four shadow prices depend on the direct harmful e￿ect of an externality given by iMWPki.
It is the total marginal willingness to pay of all individuals of type i to avoid an externality. As
its sign is always positive it increases the value of the shadow price. In addition, the shadow









@c2i, i = L;H, respectively. It describes by how much
commodity tax revenues change if the reference consumption level of good k marginally increases.
The sign of this term is again ambiguous, as the reaction of compensated demands due to a change
of cki can have either sign.
In general, the shadow prices measured in terms of tax revenues can be either positive or negative,
because the sign of some terms in (11) is ambiguous. That is, in principle an increase in the
reference level can also lead to a social gain. However, the case that an increase of the reference
consumption level is socially harmful (positive shadow prices) appears more plausible because of
the direct negative e￿ect.
123.2 Optimal commodity tax rates



























































































































































Equation (12) follows from the ￿rst-order conditions of the government’s maximization problem.
Applying Cramer’s rule one can derive an implicit solution for 1;2;3. We start with a discussion












(kH(L)   kL(L)) +
kH

(kH(H)   1L(H))]Dk; (14)


































































with k;n = 1;2 and k 6= n. For expositional reasons we have introduced the variable  j, j = 1;2;3,
which captures the well-known self-selection part of commodity taxation. A formal de￿nition of
 j is also provided in the Appendix. This self-selection part also appears in a model without
externalities and can be considered as the non-Pigouvian part of the tax formula. It is zero
if preferences are weakly separable in labor supply and consumption as then the mimicker and
the L type have the same consumption pattern, that is cjH[L] = cjL;j = 1;2;3. In that case
commodity taxes have no e￿ect on the self-selection constraint (and are redundant in the absence
of externalities).
The interesting aspect of equation (14) is, however, that in addition to the self-selection based
part the shadow prices of the externalities appear in the tax formula. Thus, in our model it is
in general optimal to also tax the nonpositional good for externality-correcting purposes, which
13violates the ’additivity property’. But one immediately observes that the Pigouvian part in (14) is
zero if kL(i) = kH(i), k = 1;2 and i = L;H, i.e. if the consumption of the two types is weighted
equally in the formation of the reference levels. Also if there are no compensated cross-price e￿ects,
the Pigouvian elements from (14) disappear as then Dk = 0. But even if cross-price e￿ects are
nonzero and kL(i) 6= kH(i), k = 1;2 and i = L;H, a condition exists under which the optimal


















k = 1;2 and j;m = 1;2;3, the Pigouvian parts from (14) are zero even if cross-price e￿ects are
present and even if the consumption of the two types is weighted di￿erently in the formation of the
reference levels. This follows from the fact that Dk is equal to zero if (16) holds. The condition
given by (16) is illuminating as it highlights the role that a tax on the nonpositional good can play
to combat the externalities induced by the consumption of the positional commodities. If the pro-
portions of compensated price e￿ects (own to cross and cross to cross price e￿ects) for commodities
1 and 2 are the same for both types as stated in (16), then commodity 3 should not be taxed to
correct for the externalities. In other words, if the two types react in the same way to relative price
changes, then by taxing the nonpositional good no additional targeting can be achieved, which
would be desirable if the consumption of the two types were weighted di￿erently. But if, loosely
speaking, introducing a tax on the nonpositional commodity modi￿es the consumption baskets of
the two types such that the type, whose consumption is weighted stronger in the formation of the
reference levels, consumes relatively more of the nonpositional good than the other type after the
introduction of the tax, then 3 serves to correct for the externalities. Proposition 1 summarizes
this result.
Proposition 1: In general a tax on the nonpositional commodity serves to correct for the exter-
nalities induced by the consumption of commodities 1 and 2 violating the ’additivity property’.
If, however, at least one of the following properties holds, then 3 contains no Pigouvian elements
and is zero given that preferences are weakly separable in labor supply and consumption. These
properties are
(i) equal weights kL(i) = kH(i), k = 1;2 and i = L;H,
(ii) no cross-price e￿ects,
(iii) equal proportions of compensated price e￿ects as given by (16).
14The intuition for this result is that if the two types are equally e￿ective as externality-generating
units then the linearity restriction of 1 and 2 does not matter for externality-correcting purposes.
Otherwise additional di￿erentiation between them is desirable, which is possible with the full set of
commodity taxes if cross-price e￿ects are present and if the two types react di￿erently to changes
in 1;2;3.
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One can see that also the tax rates on the positional commodities depend in a complex way on
all four shadow prices. Remarkably, also the shadow prices of the respective other externality-
generating commodity appear explicitly in the optimal tax formula, i.e. 1 and 2 depend on
both externalities. This is also in contradiction to the ’additivity property’ which states that the
presence of an externality only alters the tax formula on that particular good.
To get a better intuition for equation (17) assume for a moment equal weights kL(i) = kH(i) =











12This assumption guarantees, loosely speaking, that it does not matter who consumes a positional commodity.
But the two types still might have di￿erent reference levels to which they compare their consumption to, as
k(L) 6= k(H) is still possible.
15k = 1;2. Observe that with equal weights the de￿nition given in (18) reduces to Eks  k(s)jBj,
s = L;H. Further, the e￿ect of the shadow prices of the other externality-generating good given
by the second line on the RHS of (17) is zero in that case. The optimal tax formula given by
equation (20) looks similar to those provided by Pirttil￿ and Tuomala (1997) and Cremer et al.
(1998) where the externality is assumed to be of the ’atmospheric’ type. The main di￿erence is
that even with equal weights the high- and the low-able still might face di￿erent externalities in
our framework, and hence the Pigouvian part in (20) consists of a weighted sum of the shadow
prices for the two income groups.
The most striking di￿erence between (17) and (20) is that in (20) only the shadow prices of the
taxed commodity appear explicitly in the optimal tax formula. 13 Thus, the fact that for positional
externalities it might matter who consumes the status good has strong implications for the optimal
commodity tax structure. But also if kL(i) 6= kH(i), k = 1;2, the part that includes the shadow
prices of the other externality-generating commodity (second line in (17)) cancels out if there are
no cross-price e￿ects and/or the proportions in equation (16) hold as then Fk given by (19) is
equal to zero. This is of course related to the result provided in Proposition 1. Also the intuition
is similar. If the consumption of the two types is weighted di￿erently in the formation of the
reference levels, then additional di￿erentiation between them is desirable for externality-correcting
purposes. This additional di￿erentiation is possible with the set of commodity taxes if the two
types react di￿erently to relative price changes and if cross-price e￿ects are present. The potential
role of the income tax in order to achieve this additional di￿erentiation will be discussed in section
4. Proposition 2 summarizes the result for the optimal tax rates on the positional commodities 1
and 2.
Proposition 2: In general the optimal tax rates on the positional commodities depend explicitly
on the shadow prices of both externalities which violates the ’additivity property’. But if one of
the following properties applies, ni= a￿ects k only indirectly through its e￿ect on ki= (see
Lemma 1), with k;n = 1;2 and k 6= n. These properties are:
(i) kH(i) = kL(i), i = L;H,
(ii) no cross-price e￿ects,
(iii) equal proportions of compensated price e￿ects as given by (16).
13Note, however, that from Lemma 1 we know that as a consequence of our multi-externality assumption the shadow
prices depend on each other if @ccom
1i =@c2i 6= 0 and @ccom
2i =@c1i 6= 0. Then, even with equal weights, the tax rates
on the positional commodities are a￿ected by all shadow prices due to this interdependence of the externalities.
16Altogether from Propositions 1 and 2 we can conclude that the ’additivity property’, stating
that an externality is best addressed by imposing a tax directly on the externality-generating com-
modity and leaving all other tax instruments una￿ected by the externality, does not hold in our
model. Rather the full set of commodity taxes should be applied to achieve an e￿cient allocation
by internalizing the externalities. Concerning the sign of optimal commodity tax rates not much
can be said in particular with respect to 3. Also the tax rates on the the positional commodities
can in principle have either sign, but if shadow prices are positive 1 and 2 are likely to be posi-
tive. In order to be able to make a precise statement about the sign and the magnitude of optimal
commodity tax rates one would have to specify preferences and make speci￿c assumptions about
the reference levels.
Two examples: upward comparison and within-group comparison
Two possible variants of our model that are frequently discussed in the literature are upward
and with￿n-group comparison. Both of them can easily be implemented into our model just by
adapting weights properly. Hence, all results from above can be applied to these special cases.
In particular upward comparison received a lot of attention from both the theoretical and empiri-
cal literature.14 There are two alternative approaches to implement the idea of upward comparison
into our model. In the ￿rst approach all individuals compare their consumption to the consumption
of the high-able individuals, while in the second one only the L types compare their consumption
to the one of the H types and the H-types themselfes have no positional concerns. For the former
the reference levels are then given by ckL = kH(L)HckH and ckH = kH(H)HckH, k = 1;2.
For the latter again ckL = kH(L)HckH, k = 1;2, but the H types make no comparisons in that
case. In both cases the two types are not equally e￿ective as externality-generating units as only
the consumption of the H types increases the reference levels. 15
Assuming within-group comparisons, means that individuals only compare themselves with in-
dividuals in the same income group. 16 Indeed, some evidence suggests that people mainly compare
themselves with similar individuals (see for example Runciman, 1966). The reference levels are
then equal to ckH = kH(H)HckH and ckL = kL(L)LckL. From this formulation it follows
that the consumption of an individual i only imposes an externality on other individuals with the
same income.
14See for example Micheletto (2010) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) for theoretical studies assuming
upward comparison and Bowles and Park (2005) for an empirical study supporting this assumption.
15The weights kL(i) are set equal to zero in both cases, implying that the consumption of the L types does not
cause an externality.
16See for example Knell (1999) for an application of such a reference level.
17It follows from Proposition 1 and 2 that in both cases, it is in general optimal to use all available
commodity taxes to internalize the externalities induced by the consumption of commodities 1 and
2. Clearly, for this statement to be true it is essential that cross-price e￿ects are present and that
equation (16) does not hold.
4 Marginal income tax rates
In the previous section we have established the result that it is in general optimal to use the whole
set of commodity taxes, notably also the tax on the nonpositional good, in order to correct for the
externalities. In this section we analyze the potential role of the income tax to serve for the same
purpose, that is, we want to ￿nd out if the presence of the externalities a￿ects the optimal income
tax schedule, and if yes, how.
The marginal income tax rates can easily be obtained by dividing the ￿rst-order conditions for zi
and xi (A3 by A1 and A4 by A2) and by using equation (5). The intuition is that the government
chooses the optimal gross and net income for each individual and then determines an income tax
function such that individuals realize those bundles. In the Appendix we show that the optimal


























































From (21) and (22) it can be concluded that in general also the marginal income tax rates are
a￿ected by the externalities, which implies that the ’additivity property’ is also violated with
respect to the income tax. This can immediately be seen by plugging in the optimal commodity
tax rates given by (14) and (17) into (21) and (22). Then one observes that the optimal income tax
schedule depends explicitly on all shadow prices of the externalities. If, however, kH(i) = kL(i),
k = 1;2 and i = L;H (property (i) in Proposition 1), then the ’additivity property’ is also restored
with respect to the income tax as then the Pigouvian elements (the sum term) in (21) and (22)
cancel out. Note that with equal weights optimal commodity tax rates on goods 1 and 2 are given
18by (20) and the tax rate on the nonpositional good reduces to 3 = 1
jBj 3, from which it follows
that the Pigouvian parts in (21) and (22) drop out.
An interesting di￿erence between the results concerning the income tax and the tax on the
nonpositional good is that from Proposition 1 we know that even if the two types are not equally
e￿ective as externality-generating units, 3 is una￿ected by the externalities if there are no cross
price e￿ects and/or equation (16) holds (properties (ii) and (iii)). However, the same is not true for
the marginal income tax rates which are in￿uenced by the externalities as soon as kH(i) 6= kL(i).
A closely related result is due to Micheletto (2008) who showed that whenever the ’additivity prop-
erty’ is violated with respect to the commodity tax structure, also the income tax schedule contains
Pigouvian elements, but that the reverse is not necessarily true. We have derived explicit condi-
tions for this result. Proposition 3 summarizes our characterization of the income tax schedule.
Proposition 3: In general the optimal marginal income tax rates for both types depend on
the externalities. Thus, the ’additivity property’ is also violated with respect to the income tax.
Only if kH(i) = kL(i), k = 1;2 and i = L;H, the positional externalities have no impact on the
income tax.
Note that without further assumptions the sign of the Pigouvian parts in the income tax schedule
is ambiguous, even if shadow prices are assumed to be positive. It depends on whether the opti-
mal commodity tax rates k, k = 1;2 are larger or smaller than the weighted sum of the shadow
prices of the taxed commodity k, on whether the status goods are complements or substitutes to
leisure (@cki=@zi ? 0) and on whether demand for the status goods increases with net income
(@cki=@xi ? 0). In the next subsection we discuss the optimal income tax schedule if commodity
taxes are restricted to be uniform. For this scenario more precise statements concerning the sign
and the shape of the Pigouvian parts in the marginal income tax rates can be made.
4.1 Optimal income tax schedule with uniform taxation of commodities
One potential objection against our results is that di￿erential taxation of status goods might not
be feasible for political economy reasons. 17 In this subsection we touch upon this issue and assume
that total consumption is restricted to be taxed uniformly at a rate , i.e. di￿erential taxation of
status goods is no longer possible. Without loss of generality we set  = 0 since the e￿ect of any
uniform consumption tax can also be attained through the income tax. Given this restriction on
17This point has been raised for example by Ireland (2001) and Frank (1999, 2008).
19the commodity tax structure we analyze the role of the income tax to internalize the positional
externalities. The optimal marginal income tax rates can again be obtained by combining the
￿rst-order-conditions for xi;zi with equation (5) and by taking into account the restriction that












































In the abscence of commodity taxes only the income tax can be used to correct for the positional
externalities. Hence, the income tax is a￿ected by the externalities no matter how the reference
level looks like. But surprisingly, the sign of the corrective parts in (23) and (24) (sum term) is still
ambiguous, even if shadow prices are positive. This ambiguity in the sign of the Pigouvian part in
the income tax schedule is an important di￿erence to the results in previous studies on the optimal
income tax when relative consumption matters, which assume that there is only one consumption
good (see for example Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008). There, as soon as the shadow
price is positive, the Pigouvian part in the income tax schedule is also positive. 18 Things become
more complicated if there are both positional and nonpositional forms of consumption. For exam-
ple, if a status good is a complement to leisure, and hence @cki=@zi < 0, then there is an e￿ect
that works in the opposite direction requiring a lower or even negative marginal income tax rate.
The intuition for this e￿ect is that increasing the marginal income tax rate induces individuals to
enjoy more leisure and to also consume more of the status good. Clearly, if the status good is a
normal good, and hence @cki=@xi > 0, this e￿ect might be o￿set by the e￿ect of a reduction in
net income on the demand for the status good. The point is that if individuals can spend their
income on positional and nonpositional goods, a higher income tax does not necessarily imply
lower consumption of the positional good, which is in contrast to a model where all consumption
is assumed to be positional. This result is stated in Proposition 4.
18Their formulas for the marginal income tax rates do not include a shadow price. In their notation, a su￿cient
condition for the relative consumption concerns to contribute to higher marginal income tax rates is that the
low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker. In the absence of commodity taxes this condition would
imply positive shadow prices in our framework, which justi￿es this statement.
20Proposition 4: Assume that shadow prices are positive and that commodities 1 and 2 are normal
goods, i.e. ki= > 0 and @cki=@xi > 0 with k = 1;2 and i = L;H. Then the Pigouvian parts in
the income tax schedule are unambiguously positive if demand for commodities 1 and 2 is either
una￿ected by leisure or decreases with leisure ( @cki=@zi  0). If, however, the demand for status
goods increases with leisure (@cki=@zi < 0) the sign of the Pigouvian part is ambiguous.
Finally, we show that with some additional assumptions the Pigouvian part in the income tax
schedule is progressive. The Pigouvian elements in (23) and (24) are given by the ￿rst term on the
RHS of these equations. Assuming that the consumption of the H type has a larger weight in the



















holds, provided that the shadow prices are positive. Given kH(i) > kL(i) a su￿cient condition
for the Pigouvian element in the optimal marginal income tax rate to be larger for the H type (see


























k = 1;2. This condition states that the H types change their demand for the positional commodities
at least as much as the L types, in case of a marginal increase of gross income which is compensated
such that their utility does not change. Further, this change in demand has to be positive, which is
guaranteed if commodity k is a normal good and if demand for k is una￿ected by leisure or a substi-
tute to leisure. Observe that if preferences are weakly separable in labor supply and consumption
and homothetic in consumption this condition reduces to MRSH
zx  MRSL
zx at the optimal bun-
dles (zH;xH), (zL;xL) as with such preferences @cki=@zi = 0 and @ckH=@xH = @ckL=@xL. In the
absence of externalities the inequality MRSH
zx  MRSL
zx holds at the optimal allocation, which
is an immediate consequence of the zero at the top result in the standard version of the Mirrlees
income tax model (Sadka, 1976; Seade, 1977). But in our model this inequality can in principle
be violated as it is optimal to also distort the decision of the H types. Nevertheless, if the social
damage caused by the externality is small, this condition is likely to hold. The result concerning
the progressivity of the Pigouvian part in the income tax schedule is summarized in Proposition 5.
21Proposition 5: Assume that kH(i) > kL(i), k = 1;2 and i = L;H. Then, if the exter-
nality is socially harmful (positive shadow prices), equation (26) is a su￿cient but not necessary
condition for the Pigouvian parts in the optimal income tax schedule to be progressive.
Thus, if the consumption of the H type has a larger weight in the formation of the external-
ity, then it is optimal for the Pigouvian element in the income tax schedule to be larger for the
H type, at least if the consumption of commodities 1 and 2 of the high-ables responds at least as
strong to a change in gross-income than the one of the low-able.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the optimal taxation of income and commodities when individuals
make relative consumption comparisons. In contrast to previous studies we have assumed that
there are both positional and nonpositional commodities, taking into account the idea that rel-
ative consumption matters for some but not for all commodities. This view is also supported
by recent results from the empirical literature (see for example Solnick and Hemenway, 2005).
Moreover we have extended the literature on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities to a
multi-externality setting which allows us to analyze the interdependence between the externality-
generating commodities and its e￿ect on the optimal tax structure.
We have found that in general the whole tax system is a￿ected by the positional externalities.
In particular even the tax rate on the nonpositional good and the income tax serve for externality-
correcting purposes at least if the consumption of the two types is weighted di￿erently in the
formation of the reference levels (e.g. upward comparison). The reason is that in this case the
proportional taxes on the positional commodities alone cannot achieve the additional di￿erentiation
between the two types which then becomes desirable for externality-correcting purposes. Some
additional di￿erentiation can be attained with the whole set of commodity taxes provided that
cross-price e￿ects are present and that the two types react di￿erently to relative price changes.
Further di￿erentiation can be achieved with the income tax as it allows to tax the two types
di￿erently.
We have also analyzed the optimal tax structure if commodity taxes are restricted to be uniform
for example due to political economy reasons. Then only the income tax can serve to correct for the
positional externalities. In general the optimal marginal income tax rates are higher than in the
absence of relative concerns and the well-known zero at the top result does not hold. However, our
22assumption that individuals can spend their income on both positional and nonpositional forms
of consumption implies that if status consumption is a complement to leisure then the sign of the
Pigouvian part in the income tax is ambiguous. The reason is that in this case an increase in the
marginal income tax rate does not necessarily lead to a decline in the demand for status goods.
Moreover we have shown that if the consumption of the high-able individuals has a higher weight
in the formation of the reference levels then with some mild additional assumptions the Pigouvian
elements in the marginal income tax rates are progressive.
Appendix
First order conditions of the government’s maximization problem



































































































































































































2i2H(i) = 0 (A7)
Derivation of Lemma 1








































2i2L(i) = 0; (A8)





















































































2i2H(i) = 0; (A10)
k = 1;2. Substituting for (fH
@vH
@xH +  @vH








































k = 1;2. Transforming A9 and A11 (4 equations) to matrix notation, one obtains equation (11).
Derivation of optimal commodity tax rates























































































































































j = 1;2;3. There are three equations with three unknowns 1;2;3. A13 can be transformed
to matrix notation as given by equation (12). Applying Cramer’s rule one arrives after some



































































































































































































































































Derivation of optimal marginal income tax rates
Divide the ￿rst order condition for zH and xH (A4 and A2) to get
(fH + )@vH
@zH































Use the de￿nition MRSi
zx   
@vi=@zi































































Useing equation (5) yields equation (21) from the text. To arrive at the optimal marginal income








































Again use the de￿nition for the MRSL
zx from above and divide A20 by L and @vH[L]=@xL. Then



























































Multiply A21 by @vH[L]=@xL and use equation (5) to get equation (22) from the text.
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